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Ihis paper-  a product  of the  Intemational  Trade  Division,  Intemational  Economics  Department- is  part
of a larger effort in PRE to understand  the implications  for world commodity  markets of changes  in
developing  countries'  trade  policies  and  to assist  developing  countries  in designing  good  trade  and industry
policies.  Copies  are  available  free  from  the  World  Bank,  1818  H  Street  NW,  Washington  DC  20433.  Please
contact  Pauline  Kokila,  room S7-040,  extension  33716  (60 pages).
The Mexican  sugar  industry  has been  subject  to  econometric  model of the Mexican  sugar  indus-
extensive  government  controls  over land  owner-  try. This was  linked  to a global  model  of the
ship, cultivation,  harvesting,  milling,  marketing,  world  sugar industry. Stochastic  simulations
distribution,  and pricing. The many  objectives  projecdng  the Mexican  sugar  industry  under
of these  intervendons  include  protecting  produc-  these  policies  show  consumption  increasing
ers and consumers  from world  price variability,  faster  than  production  and Mexico  increasing  its
ensuring  self-sufficiency,  guaranteeing  employ-  sugar  imports. It appears  unlikely  that under
ment and social  welfare,  providing  cheap  milling  such policies  Mexico  would  return  to being  an
services,  and protecting  domestic  soft drink  exporter  of sugar.
manufacturers.
in simulations  of a sugar industry  operating
Borrell's  calculations  show  that although  the  under  essentially  free  trade conditions,  Mexico
interventions  have  helped  stabilize  industry  becomes  a significant  sugar  exporter. Produc-
rcturns  to some degree,  the estimated  effective  tion, trade,  and stocks  are more variable,  and
rate of assistance  points to a high degree  of  consumption  growth  is curtailed. But welfare  in
resource  distortion. In years when  world  prices  the economy  ac a whole would  be increased
were low, such  as in 1985-88,  the  effective  rate  substantially.  The main beneficiaries  would  be
of assistance  is estimated  in the range  of 70-390  sugar  producers,  and the  losers consumers  - but
percent.  the loss to consumers  would  average  less than
US$3.20  per person  per year.
To analyze  the impact  of changes  in Mexi-
can sugar  policies,  Borrell  constructed  an
The PRE  Working  Paper  Series  disseminates  the findings  of work  under  way  in the  Bank's  Policy,  Research,  and External
Affairs  Complex.  Anobjective  of the  series  is  to  getthese  findings  out  quickly,  even  if  presentations  are  less  than fully  polished.
The  findings,  interpretations,  and conclusions  in these  papers  do not  necess . ly  represent  official  Bank  policy.
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1.  The  Mexican sugar industry  operates  under strict government
controls. The sugar  parastatal,  AZUCAR,  and other  statt  agencies  govern
virtually  all aspects  of pricing  and, until recently,  AZUCAR  controlled
virtually  all aspects  of marketing.  State agencies  also affect the
cultivation  and  milling  of  cane  and  influence  the  operations  of  the  sweetener-
using sector.  Market  forces  appear  to play only a minor role in the
allocation  of  resources  within  the  industry  and  between  the  industry  and  the
rest  of  the  economy.  On  theoretical  ground,,  and  based  on  empirical  evidence
from  other  countries,  there  is  a strong  prima  facie  case  for  believing  that
the  economic  performance  of  the  industry  is  highly  constrained  as  a  result  of
the interventions  and that these imoOse  significant  costs  on the wider
economy.
2.  The  purpose  of this  study  is to  make  transparent  the  main  economic
effects  of  existing  sugar  policies.  Three  broad  measures  are  used  to  estimate
the resource  misallocation  effects  of intervention:  the nominal  rate  of
protection,  the  effective  rate  of  assistance  and  the  net  subsidy  equivalent.
Theoretical  arguments  are  also  used  to  demonstrate  other potential
inefficiencies  in resource  use.  To estimate  the effects  of efficiency-
improving  policies,  an economic  model  of Mexican  production,  demand,  stock
*  Brent  Borrell  completed  this  study  when  he was  employed  as  a long-term
consultant  with  the  International  Commodity  Markets  Division;  at  the  time
he was  on leave  from  the  Australian  Bureau  of  Agricultural  and  Resource
Economics.  Presently,  Brent  is  Chief  Market  Economist  with  The  Centre  for
International  Economics  in  Canberra,  Australia.- 2  -
demand  and  cane-pricing  arrangements  is  constructed.  This  model  is  linked  to
a  model  of the  world  sugar  market  to evaluate  the  trade  and  other  economic
opportunities  which  should  arise  from  policy  reforms.
3.  While the methods  used to evaluate  the current  and potential
performance  of  the  industry  have  shortcomings,  taken  together  they  provide  a
broad  indication  of the  costs  and  benefits  of  the  different  policies.  Broad
policy  reccmmendations  are  made  on  the  basis  of  the  analytical  results.-3-
1I.  BACKGEOUND
The  Structure  of the  Industry
4.  Mexico  is a large  producer  and consumer  of sugar  in  world  terms  but
has switched  from being a significant  exporter  to an importer  during  recent
years;  presently it is roughly  self-sufficient  in sugar.  For the 20-year
period to the mid-seventies,  Mexico exported  between 20X and 40% of its
domestic production (see  Table  1).  Despite strong growth  in  sugar
consumption,  export performance  was  largely maintained  due to reasonably
steady  advances  in production. However,  during  the oil  boom  years  from 1975
to 1982,  production  stagnated. Consumption,  meanwhile,  continued  to increase
strongly. From  1977  to 1986,  Mexico  was  mostly  a  net importer  of sugar. Only
recently  has  Mexico  returned  to  the  world  market  as an exporter.
5.  Production  growth  resumed  after 1982,  following  policy  changes  (the
:canero  decree  of 1979)  which  were intended  to maintain  real cane prices  in
the face of spiraling  inflation.  In 1987 and 1988, sizable  quantities  of
sugar  were exported,  albeit  due to some extent  to a rundown  in stocks.  For
1989,  net exports  are estimated  to be small  and for  1990  imports  will likely
be necessary  to  meet  the  growth  in  consumption  and  a shortfall  in production.
(i)  Production
6.  Production  is  widely  dispersed  throughout  9  main  geographical  regions
and  14 states  (see  Table  2).  There  are  70 sugar  mills  employing  about  40,000- 4 -
Table  1:  luppiy-Deamnd  Balance  Sheet  for  Mexican  Sugar
Net  End-Year  Exports/
Production  Consumption  Exports  Stocks  Production
-------------------- ('000  tons)--------------------
1960  1,530  1,121  462  404  0.30
1961  1,487  1,156  586  149  0.39
1962  1,531  1,249  365  66  0.23
1963  1,735  1,312  393  96  0.22
1964  1,933  1,424  491  114  0.25
1965  2,107  1,478  555  201  0.26
1966  2,266  1,555  513  399  0.22
1967  2,412  1,650  572  589  0.23
1968  2,338  1,767  676  482  0.28
1969  2,564  1,875  625  554  0.24
1970  2,402  1,992  612  351  0.25
1971  2,489  1,920  551  369  0.22
1972  2,587  2,075  598  282  0.23
1973  2,810  2.298  586  207  0.20
1974  2,838  2,344  496  206  0.17
1975  2,636  2,526  217  1on  0.08
1976  2,710  2,675  13  121  0
1977  2,790  2,677  0  234  0
1978  3,131  2,934  74  363  0.02
1979  3,095  3,059  30  506  0
1980  2,457  3,152  -760  650  -0.30
1981  2,642  3,261  -673  705  -0.25
1982  2,739  3,514  -522  452  -0.19
1983  3,076  3,241  -819  1,106  -0.26
1984  ',308  3,343  -273  1,349  -0.08
1985  3,492  3,547  66  1,227  0.01
1986  4,068  3,451  219  1,625  0.05
1987  4,060  3,657  518  1,510  0.12
1988  3,908  4,070  1,014  334  0.25
SourceS International  Sugar  Organization,  London.Table  28  Mexican  Sugar  Procaction,  by Region  and  State
1985  Sugar  Production
(Base  estandar,  tons)
Region  state  Private  Mills  Public  Mills
Alto  Veracruz  Veracruz  326,214  418,516
Oaxaca
Bajo  Veracruz  Veracruz  422,014
Balsam  Michoacan  143,655
Centro  Morelos  280,179
Puebla
Huastecas  San  Luis  Potosi  65,907  358,324
Veracruz
Tamaulipas
Noroeste  Sinaloa  46,822  312,593
Nayarit
Occident.  Jalisco  107,837  401,402
Colima
Pacifico  Sur  Oaxaca  144,388
Chiapas
Sureste  Tabasco  39,611  158,464
Quintana  Roo
Source: Latin  America &  Caribbean Country Department II,  Agriculture
Operations  Division,  World  Bank.-6-
workers  and around  130,000  cane suppliers  and 90,000  cara eutters.  Average
sugar production  per mill,  is around  50,000  tons  per year, which is roughly
equivalent  to the average in Cuba but only about one-half the Brazilian
average.  Cane production  is predominantly  small-scale. The average  area of
cane  harvested  per supplier  is  4.3 hectares. Most  cane is  harvested  by  hand,
compared  to Cuba and Brazil,  where  over one-half  of the cane  is mechanically
harvested. About  40%  of cane  area is irrigated. Cane  is usually  grown  in  an
eight-year  cycle  and is not grown in rotation  with other  crops.  Other  crops
could  be grown  on cane  lands;  the  two  most  likely  are  maize  and  beans.
7.  Mills generally  produce  one or two of three  grades  of sugar:  raw,
estandar  (mill  white)  and retined. About  16X  of sugar  output  is in  raw  form,
a  little  less than 35% is refined  and the  remainder  (about  50X) is  estandar.
By-products  include  molasses,  bagasse  and a small  amount  of alcohol.  About
25% of the bagasse  (the  cane fiber)  is used as pulp in paper  making  (paper
sales  make up only a minor proportion  of mill revenues).  The remainder  is
burned  as fuel  in  the  mills.
(ii) Consumption
8.  Over the  past  decade  the  annual  growth  in consumption  has averaged  a
little  over  3%.  Mostly  this reflects  Mexico's  strong  population  growth;  but
relatively  strong  growth  in  disposable  incomes  during  the  late  1970s  and  early
1980s also  stimulated growth.  By  international  standards, pei  capita
consumption  is  high  at  around  40 kg.  About  50%  of sugar  consumption  is in  the
form  of processed  focts  with the remainder  being  consumed  directly. In 1988,- 7  -
56Z  of sugar  purchased  by the  food-processing  sector  was used in soft  drinks.
Alternative  sweeteners  hold a  very small share of  the Mexican sweetener
market.
Government  Intervention  in the  Sugar  Industry
9.  Government  intervention  is pervasive.  It almost  completely  eliminates
the  normal  workings  of commercial  markets  in  the  allocation  of resources.
O  Legal restrictions  on the sale and renting  of land largely
influence  who can grow  cane  and  greatly  influence  the scale  of
operation  as well  as the  methods  of production.
O  Regulations  governing  the pricing  and delivery  terms  for cane
establish  the  incentives  which  affect  the quality  of cane,  the
proportion  of sugar and molasses  produced  from the cane, the
technology  used in mills, the narvesting  and milling season
length,  the utilization  of mills, the cane ratooning  pattern
(i.e.,  the  number  of years  the cane plant  is harvested  before
being  replanted), the  scheduling of  h'arvesting  and  mill
delivery,  and  many  cultivation  practices.
o  Government  ownership of many of  the l.sills  and centralized
control of milling operations  greatly affect their output,
technology,  investment,  location,  size  and  level  of  employment.
o  The monopoly acquisition  and marketing  powers of the sugar
parastatal  "AZUCAR"  mean  that  patterns  of  storage,
distribution,  handling,  exporting  and importing  are centrallv- 8  -
controlled--though  recently  changes  have  been  implem4nted  which
reduce  AZUCAR's  monopoly  powers.
o  Price  fixing,  price  discriminetion  and  trade  barriers  determine
the  volume  and  pattern  of production,  consumption,  trade  and
stocks,  as well as  the availability  and range of  sugar
products.
10.  The  objectives  of  Mexican  sugar  policies  are  not  explicitly  intended
to circumvent  the  workings  of  commercial  markets  nor  to impose  a  system  of
(virtual)  central  planning  on the industry. Intervention  has  a very  long
history. It  was introduced  to  protect  the  industry  from  the  volatility  of
world  prices  as  early  as  1856  and  maybe  before  then. At  that  time  prices  were
fixed  and imports  were  controlled.  Current  policLes  are the result  of a
complex  series  of  political  and  economic  responses  to  ptoblems  and  unintended
consequences  of the initial  controls;  rather  than  a deliberate,  internally-
consistent policy.  For  instance, fixed  consumer and  producer prices
(introduced  with the objective  of  protecting  both groups)  created  an
tnintended  cost-price  squeeze  which  left  many  mills  insolvent.  Government  buy
outs  and ownership  of mills  were  the result  even  though  there  was  not a
deliberate  policy  of  nationalization.
11.  The  accumulation  of  ad  hoc  responses  lef .n  its  wake  a  wide  variety
of implicit  objectives  rather  than  a prioritized  set of consistent  goals.
Over  the  last  two  decades  the  main  purposes  of intervention  appear  to have
been:- 9  -
o  To protect  the  cane-growing  sector  during  intermittent  periods
of very  low  world  prices  and to tax  it  heavily  during  short
periods  of  extremelv  high  world  prices  (see  Figure  1).
o  To  provide  a  level  of  social  welfare  to  cane  suppliers  and  mill
workers  in excess  of  that  generally  available  to  other  rural
groups.
O  To retain  the  small-scale  cane  production  system  to  maintain
rural  employment.
3  To ensure  a  continuing  supply  of  cheap  milling  services  to  the
cane-growing  sector and  to  expand employment  in mills,
irrespective  of the implicit  tax  on private  sector  mills  in
general  and the  direct  bud.3etary  costs  of st  bsidizing  public
mills.
o  To  shiels  ronsumers  from  variability  in  world  prices,  providing
v--y  high  subsidies  at times  and  extracting  relatively  small
taxes  at  others  (see  Figure  1).
o  To protect  domestically-owned  soft  drink  manufacturers  from
foreign-owned  competition  through  discriminatory  pricing.
o  To  maintain  a  high degree  of  self-sufficiency  in sugar
production,  and  to  encourage  production  through  the  provision
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III. THE  ECONOMIC  EFFECTS  OF INTERVENTION
12.  The influence  of some  forms  of government  intervention  are  reasonably
direct  and are quantifiable  in terms of their  effects  on industry  returns.
Examples  include the domestic sugar pricing  arrangements  and the subsidies
paid directly  to the industry. Other forms  of intervention  create  indirect
effects by  modifying the  production or  marketing environment.  Such
intervention  may cause costs of production  and marketing  to be higher than
otherwise and  the  extent to  which  they distort costs  is  not  easily
quantified.  Examples of  such  interventions  include the  cane  payment
arrangements  and the  restrictions  on the sale  and  renting  of land. While  the
net effect of intervention  is difficult  to determine,  it would seem that
Mexico  holds  some  comparative  advantage  in the  production  of sugar. The  high
degree  of regulation,  however,  raises  many questions  about the appropriate
size  of the  industry  and  about  its  efficiency  in  resource  use.
The  Static  Costs  of Existing
Price-Fixing  Arrangements
13.  Some of the  economic  costs  of the  Mexican  price fixing  arrangements
can  be illustrated  through  the use of a static  partial  equilibrium  analysis,
such as is represented  in Figure  2.  In Figure  2A, the situation  of Mexican
prices  being initially  above world prices  is depicted,  such  as was the case
between 1985 and 1988.  In Figure 2B the opposite initial situation  is
depicted.  In both initial  situations,  WP is the world price, PP is the
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Mexican  producers  manufacture  Q, and AZUCAR  exports  T (the rest-of-the-world
imports  T).  On domestic  sales,  the  government  must  pay  the  difference  between
PP and CP; in Figure  2A it also must pay the  difference  between  PP and WP;
while  in  Figure  2B it  earns  a rent  (WP-PP).
14.  The free trade  case is  also depicted  in Figures  2A and 2B.  In these
cases  the world price replaces  PP and CP as the ruling  Mexican  sugar  price.
Output  cuntracts  from  Q to  Q' and C expand  to C' in  Figure  2A.  Trade  changes
from  T to TI--from  subsidized  exports  to free  market  imports. In Figure  2B,
output  expands  to Q' and consumption  contracts  to C', thus allowing  for an
expansion  in exports--T  to TX.  Small changes  in world price are shown to
occur  in  both  figures  due  to changes  in  world  trade,  (iP  to iP').
15.  In both Figures  2A and 2B,  Mexican  welfare  is  greater  in the  case  of
free trade than under the current  pricing  arrangements.  1/  The costs and
benefits  of the present  policies  to the various  parties  are represented  in
Figures  2A  and  2B as follows:
- loss in consumer surplus:  (b +  c +  e + f + g)
- gain in producer rents:  (a +  b +  c)
- loss in Mexican government revenue:  (a +  c + d +  f +  h)
- net  cost  to Mexico: (d +  e +  2f +  g +  h)
- gain  to  consumers  in the  rest  of the  world:  (i  + k)
- loss  to producers  in  the  rest  of the  world: (i  +  j)
- net loss to the rest of the world:  (j - k)
1/  The  measures  on  welfare  change  used  are  producer  rent  and  consumer  surplus
(see  Mishan,  1968,  and  Willig,  1976).- 14  -
16.  In Figure  2B the costs  and benefits  of the present  policies  are as
follows:
- gain in consumer surplus:  (a +  b)
- loss  in producer  rents: (a  +  c +  d +  e)
- loss in Mexican government revenue:  (b +  g - d - f)
- net cost to Mexico:  (c +  e + g - f)
- loss  to consumers  in the  rest  of the  world:  (i + j)
- gain  to producers  in the  rest  of the  world:  (i)
- net  loss  to the  rest  of the  world: (j)
The  Effective  Level  of Assistance
17.  The  nominal rate  of  assistance (NRA),  the  effective rate  of
assistance  (ERA),  and the  net  subsidy  equivalent  (NSE)  are  three  measures  used
to make a broad  assessment  of the distortionary  influence  of intervention  on
an industry. Of the  measures,  the ERA is the most comprehensive. It takes
account  of the main direct  effects  of intervention  on both input  and output
prices,  and provides  an indication  of the net assistance  to the industry's
value adding activities.  To the extent that the assistance  enables an
industry  to command  and use  more resources  than otherwise,  the ERA indicates
the  inefficiencies arising  from  the  misallocation of  resources  in
production.  Estimates  of the  three  measures  are  given  in  Table  3.
18.  In recent  years  the  ERA has  mostly  been  large  and  positive. This  has
arisen  largely  because  world  prices  were very  low  during  this period  and  well- lIs  -
Table  3: Effective  Rate  of  Assistance  to  the  Mexican  Sugar  Industry
Unit  1989  1988  1987  1986  1985
lue  of  Output  PESOm  2,732,000  2,732,000  2,732,000  2,732,000  2,732,000
SS Total  Inputs
o  materials  In  milling  PESOm  171,500  171,500  171,500  171,500  171,500
o  depreciation  in  milling  PESOm  210,000  210,000  210,000  210,000  210,000
o materials  and deprecia-
tion  in  growing  PESOm  343,000  343,000  343,000  343,000  343,000
o materials  in  marketing  PESOm  129,500  129,500  129,500  129,500  129,500
Value  added  PESOm  2,075,764  2,075,764  2,075,764  2,075,764  2,075,764
PLUS  Assistance  to  Value
Adding  Factors
o sugar  sales  subsidy  PESO.  100,000  100,000  100,000  100,000  100,000
3  mill  loss  subsidy  PESOm  285,000  285,000  285,000  285,000  285,000
o AZUCAR  admin.  cost  sub  PESOm  88,000  88,000  88,000  88,000  88,000
3  storage  cost  subsidy  PESOm  450,000  450,000  450,000  450,000  450,000
Assisted  Value  Added  PESOm  2,998,764  2,998,764  2,998,764  2,998,764  2,998,764
LESS Assistance  to  Outputs
o domestic  pricing  PESOm  -740,245  31,365  656,640  802,975  1,172,890
LESS Assistance  to  Inputs
o fertilizer  subsidy  PESOm  92,635  92,635  92,635  92,635  92,635
o  fuel  subsidy  PESOm  200,000  200,000  200,000  200,000  200,000
LESS Assistance  to
Value  Adding  Factors  PESOm  923,000  923,000  923,000  923,000  923,000
,assisted  Value  Added  PESOm  2,523,374  1,751,764  1,126,489  980,154  610,239
Net  Subsidy  Equivalent  PESO.  475,390  1,247,000  1,872,275  2,018,610  2,388,525
Effective  Rate  Assistance  S  18.8394  71.1853  166.204  205.948  391.408
Nominal  Rate  Assistance  S  -21.318  1.16139  31.6398  41.6259  75.2281
Source:  AZUCAR
Notes:  (a) Data  for  1989 have  been used  to  calculate  assisted  value  added  in  all  years,  as  assisted  value
added  information  for  1988 and  earlier  are  not  available--this  probably  does  not  change  much
from  year  to  year.
(b)  Assistance  to  output  has  been  estimated  for  all  years--this  can  change  greatly  from  year  to
year  as  the  wortd  price  changes.- 16 -
below the  fixed  prices  on the  domestic  market. As a result the  nominal  rate
of assistance  was  very  high.  The rise of world  prices  in 1989  caused  the  NRA
and  the  ERA  to decline  substantially.  If prices  continue  to rise  (above  about
USC15/lb)  it is  likely  that  the  ERA  will become  negative. The  world  market  is
notoriously  volatile  and cyclical.  Every six to nine years the  world price
has  boomed  and  been  sustained  well  above  the 15C/lb  mark for  periods  of two  to
three  years.  Although  data are not available  to make reliable  estimates  of
the  ERA  for  earlier periods, it appears (see Figure 1  which gives an
indication  of the  nominal  rate of protection  which is similar  to the  nominal
rate of assistance)  that the ERA  was probably  large  and  negative  in 1963-64,
again in 1973-76,  and also in 1980-81.  It is also likely  that the ERA was
probably  large  and positive  in the intervening  periods,  such  as that  between
1985  and  1988.
19.  It would  appear  that the  main influence  of intervention  has been to
inject  some degree  of stability  into industry  returns.  Nonetheless,  whether
the ERA is positive  or negative,  that it is large  indicates  intervention  has
potentially  distorted  resource  use to a very high degree.  Such distortions
can  impose  heavy  costs  on the  industry  and  on the  wider  economy.
20.  For  example,  as a result  of intervention,  production,  consumption  and
trade are distorted  through  time such that optimal  adjustments  to changing
world market opportunities  are not made.  Further,  deadweight  losses are
imposed  on the wider  economy  through  the raising  of tax revenues  to provide
contingent  assistance.  While  the  high degree  of regulation,  which  has stemmed
from  the  granting  of assistance,  may protect  some  producers  or consumers  from- 17  -
changing  market  conditions,  it  penalizes  others  who  may  be made  to bear  higher
costs  or who  are prevented  from  pursuing  profitable  opportunities.  Therefore,
instability  of the world  market  is, to some extent,  swapped  for  the  vagaries
associated  with the political  decision-making  processes. Thus, any  gains in
terms of reduced uncertainty  arising as a  result  of intervention  are not
clear-cut. Uncertainty  has probably  increased  since  Mexico  entered  its  period
of  high  inflation  after  the initial  oil  boom in the  mid-seventies.  Since  then
real returns  have been heavily  influenced  by political  decisions  to adjust
nominally-fixed  prices,  milling  subsidies  and other instruments. These have
not  been  adjusted  regularly  nor  in  a predictable  fashion.
The  Effects  of Intervention  on Industry  Costs
21.  The nature of  the economic costs of  intervention  to the  sugar
industry can  be  illustrated  by  reference to  the  same  static partial
equilibrium  analysis  presented  in Figure  2.  Removal  of interventions  which
allow  industry  costs  to fall can be represented  as a rightwards  shift  in the
supply  curve.  In Figure  3, the  effects  of such  a shift  from the situations
depicted  in Figure  2 are demonstrated. In all situations  production  would
expand and  producer  rents would increase  by the shaded areas, adding to
Mexican  welfare.
22.  No aggregate  measure  of the extent  of the cost burden  is available.
However,  AZUCAR (1989)  demonstrates  that a number of realistic  changes in
growing,  milling  and  marketing  could  lower  total  costs  of production  by about
20X (these  are discussed  in general  below).  The types  of changes  indicated'igure  3:  PRICE  ANi  LtLLFAKL EFFECTS OF  A  SifIFT  I-  THE SUPPLY CUMYE
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were chosen  for illustrative  purposes  only arnd  do not purport  to represent
optimal  changes. Cost  reductions  in  excess  of 20%  may therefore  be attainable
over  the  longer  term.
Overall  Assessment  of Economic  Costs
of Existing  Policies
23.  It  would  take  considerable  data  and  detailed  analysis  to  estimate  the
net  effects  of intervention  on industry  costs. Nevertheless,  from  prima  facie
evidence presented in Appendix 1,  it seems reasonable  to  conclude that
intervention  presently  imposes  sizable  cost penalties  on the industry  and  may
have  done  so for  many  years.
24.  Legal  restrictions  on the sale  and  rental  of land,  for  instance:
a.  prevent  efficient  farmL  s  competing  with less  efficient  farmers
for  resources;
b.  cause  more intensive  use  of expensive  non-land  inputs,
c.  restrict  farm  amalgamation,  restricting  the  rate  of
capitalization,  mechanization  and achievement  of economies  of
scale  on-farm;
d.  limit the rate at which progressive  farmers can  introduce
higher-yielding  varieties  of cane  and  new technology.- 20 -
25.  Regulations  governing  the  pricing  and  delivery  terms  for  cane  distort
the incentives  for  growers  and  millers  to maximize  efficiency  of the industry
as a whole. For  example:
a.  payment for  cane  is  not  based  on  the  sugar c.ontent  of
individual  farmers'  cane,  causing  efficient  farmers  to cross-
subsidize  inefficient  farmers,  which reduces  output  generally,
and increases  the cost of milling--there  are scale  effects  of
milling  cane  of high  sugar  content  which  are  not  achieved;
b.  premiums  and discounts  on the price  of cane through  the season
are  not set,  which  distorts  incentives  to adjust  season  length
to its  optimum--leading  to inefficient  use  of available  milling
capacity;
C.  mills  can pass losses  of sugar in  milling  back to farmers  and
have incentives to  maximize molasses producton instead of
optimizing  sugar  output;  therefore,  inefficient  mill practices
can  be sustained  and  industry  profit  is  not  maximized;
d.  mills cannot change cane prices to adjust cane supplies  to
levels  that  allow  optimal  use  of existing  capacity.
26.  Government  ownership  of  milling  assets  and  centralized  (bureaucratic)
decision-making  processes:
a.  means that the  market  for  milling  capital  is not competitive,
which  probably  protects  inefficient  management,  distorts  the- 21 -
location,  size  and capacity  utilization  of mills,  and restricts
financing  of new technologies;
b.  locks entrepreneurship  out of the industry  and restricts  the
adoption  of  modern  management  ideas  and system,;
c.  lacks  flexibility  to solve  practical  problems  quickly;
d.  places  political  constraints  on the profit  function  which  has
lead  to overmanning  and  generous  wage settlements.
27.  Price  fixing  and trade  barriers,  as well as insulating  the industry
from  world  trade:
a.  protect  inefficiencies  in  marketing
b.  differential  pricing  of sugar causes  waste in the sugar-using
sector,  reducing  the  amount  of sugar  available  for  export
c.  consumer protection  varies inversely to industry  protection
adding  to the inefficient  use  of sugar  and  other  sweeteners.
In general,  centralized  (bureaucratic  and  political)  decision-making  processes
and isolationist  trade  policies  d')  not provide  for efficient  mechanisms  for
allocating  resources,  either  within  the industry  or between  the industry  and
the rest  of the economy.  Also, the  costs  of intervention  have the potential
to grow  over  time.  Virtually  isolated  from  the  world  market,  the  structure  of
the industry  may well diverge  further  and further  from the  economic  optimum.
Then,  too, it should  be noted that  despite  the cost  disabilities  imposed  and
the lost opportunities  for adjustment,  over the long term the industry  has
managed  to  grow  while  receiving on  average relatively low  rates  of
assistance.  The potential  therefore  for improving  the performance  nf the- 22 -
industry  and its  contribution  to the  wider  economy  may be considerable.
Recent  Changes  to Regulations  and  Controls
28.  On November  15, 1989,  the  monopoly  import  and acquisition  powers  of
AZUCAR  were removed.  The requirement  that millers pay a 50% tax to market
sugar  outside  the  AZUCAR  distribution  system  has  been  effectively  nullified  by
the  granting  of a 100l  rebate  on any such  taxes  paid.  And in place  of import
licenses  which were previously  usec to exclude private imports,  a  10  ad
valorem tariff now  stands as  the only barrier to free entry.  However,
controls on  prices  remain and  AZUCAR's monopoly exporting rights are
unchanged.
29.  Presently,  the fixed  domestic  consumer  price  is roughly  in line  with
the import  parity  price  of sugar. Under  existing  policies,  controls  on price
will be difficult to maintain if the world price changes.  If it falls,
imports  would  enter the  country  quite freely  and undercut  .he  fixed  domestic
prices.  If it rises,  there  will be strong  pressure  for  black  market  sales.
The production  shortfall  in the domestic  market  in 1990  will cause  a rise in
import  demand. However,  imports  will  be unattractive  unless  they  can  be sold
through  the  black  market  at prices  equal  to or in excess  of the  world price.
The costs  of attempting  to maintain  price  controls  may be very large.  For
example,  the  policing  costs  of preventing  black  market  activity  are likely  to
be great.  And, although  black  market  activities  may help improve  allocative
efficiency  in some  ways,  efficiency  losses  through  "double  handling"  are also
likely  to be large.- 23  -
IV.  PROSPECTS  FOR  THE MEXICAN  SUCAR  INDUSTRY
UWDER  DIFFERMfT  POLICIES
30.  An econometric  model of the Mexican sugar  market was developed  to
illustrate  the  effects  of the  continuation  of existing  policies  and  to  analyze
alternative  policies.  The model is documented in Appendix 2.  The main
features  of the  model  are:
- production, consumption and  stock  demand  are  explicitly
modeled;
- yield  and  area  are  separately  modeled;
- trade  (net  exports)  is  modeled  implicitly  as a residual;
- the  Mexican  market  is linked  to a world  market  model  (by  Wong,
Sturgiss  and  Borrell,  1989)  through  trade;
- the model includes  dynamic linkages  of market  variables  from
one year to the next, so that the effects  of policy  can be
observed  through  successive  time  periods;
- the world  model includes  the domestic  markets  and policies  of
the four largest  importers  and four largest  exporters,  plus a
rest-of-the-world  sector;
- the  world  model  captures  the  volatility  in the  world  market.
Illustration  of the  Effects  of  a Continuation
of Existing  Policies  to 2004
31.  To project  the broad  direction  of the  Mexican  market  under  existing
policies,  stochastic  simulations  using the linked  Mexican-world  model were- 24 -
performed. Stochastic  simulations  are  performed  tc capture  the  volatility  of
the  world market.  The model was run 60 times  over the period  1985 to 2004
with different  shocks  representing  random  elements  affecting  production  (such
as the weather)  being applied in each year and in each simulacion.  The
results  presented  in Table  4 are the  averages  of the  60 simulations.  For  the
world price,  the averages  tend to mask the high level of price variability
likely  to occur  (see  the  range  of prices  forecast).
32.  Because the results presented  are the averages  of 60 simulations,
they represent  the average impact under a wide rango of potential  market
conditions. Therefore,  the results  should  be regarded  as illustrative  of the
potential  impact  under  various  market  conditions  rather  than  forecast  effects
based on current  market conditions.  The forward  simulations  are performed
based on information  up until 1985.  The simulations  therefore  do not, for
instance,  take account of the  recent, and mostly unexpected,  decline in
Mexican  production--caused,  in  part,  by frost  damag.
33.  Also,  most exogenous  variables  are set  according  to those  given in
Wong et al. (1989).  So, for this and the reasons  given above,  the price
projections  given in Table  4 should  not be regarded  as World  Bank  forecasts.
They  do, however,  represent  the type of price  behavior  that  can  generally  be
expected  in  the  world  market.
34.  Mexican  cane prices, consumer  prices,  the percentage  extraction  of
sugar,  and the stocks-to-production  ratio  are exogenously  determined  and are
set  from  1988  onwards  at average  levels  over  the  period  1967  to 1987. (Strong- 25 -
Table 4:  Projections  of Mexican Sugar  Production,  Consumption,  Trade a  d World Prices, 1985-2004
(Unchanged  Policy Scenario)
Year-End  World Price
Year  Production  Consumption  Not Exports  Stocks  World Price  Sim. i  a/  Cane Price
- ------  (illion  tons)-----------------  ------(1984  US¢/lb)------  (1180  pesos/ton)
1985  3.45  3.31  0.726  0.76  7.9  6.7  448
1986  3,75  3,44  0.248  0.83  6.6  5.1  483
1967  3.98  3.63  0.394  0.88  9,6  7.4  435
196  4.29  3.67  0.551  0.94  10.7  12.6  330
1989  4.00  3.80  0.26  0.88  15.1  14.4  350
990  3.94  3.94  0.016  0,87  15.5  18.6  393
1991  3.98  4.08  -0.108  0.88  12.8  1o.7  393
1992  4.01  4.23  -0.223  0.88  15.7  17.5  393
1993  4.25  4.38  -0.185  0.94  26.7  17.9  393
1994  4.63  4.54  -0.001  1.02  24.7  26.8  393
1995  4.70  4.71  -0.029  1.03  15.4  25.5  393
1996  4.77  4.88  -0.128  1.05  12.3  9.7  393
1997  4.88  5.07  -0,209  1.07  13.3  9.8  393
1998  4.98  5.25  -0,292  1.10  15.8  16.4  393
1999  5.09  5.45  -0.382  1.12  16.3  21.0  393
2000  5.19  5,65  -0.481  1,14  15,6  25.5  393
2(01  5.07  5,86  -0.761  1.12  20.8  24,2  393
2002  5.40  6.08  -0.753  1.19  23.7  22,6  393
2003  5.50  6,31  -0.83  1.21  19.9  30.6  393
2004  5.60  6.55  -0.964  1.23  17.3  25,4  393
Mean of 1200  observdtions  15.8
Coefficient of Vacidtion  0.45
Range Min-Max o! 60 simulations  3.1-50.1
S  of Observations ihi  the Range  8.8-21.8x67
a/  Simulation I  wd'.  the first  ot  ilie  60 stochastic  simulations  and was included  to illustrate  a  moro
realistic variability  of prices than is evident in the averages  of all 60 simulations  given in the
preceding columns.- 26 -
econometric  evidence  could not be found to establish  significant  behavioral
equations for  these  four  variables.)  The sugar  equivalent cane  price  was
assumed  to be 60% of the mill door sugar  price (40% of the sugar  price is
fairly  representative  of the milling  margin in other major cane producers:
Australia,  Brazil,  Colombia,  Mauritius,  South  Africa  and  Thailand,  which  range
from  30%  to 502).  A  margin  of US¢1.7/lb  was  assumed  between  the  mill  door  and
consumer  prices.
35.  As argued  earlier,  there  is  no direct  relationship  between  cane,  mill
door and consumer prices, and milling and marketing margins can move in
arbitrary  ways.  Government  subsidies  can greatly  distort such  margins.  No
attempt  has been  made to account  explicitly  for such subsidies  in the  model.
Supply is modeled as  a  function of  the cane price only.  So explicit
determination  of  the  subsidies is  inconsequential  to  the assumed supply
response  (see  Appendix  2).  Nonetheless,  attempts  are made later  to account
for  the  welfare  effects  of such  subsidies. For  the  baseline  simulation  it  was
assumed that the number of mills owned by government in 1987 continued
unaltered  into  the  future.
36.  The most striking  feature  of Table  4 is the trend  towards  increased
imports  which  rise  to around  1  million  tons  by 2004.  Consumption  is  projected
to continue  to grow strongly  in line  with population  growth,  and to  a lesser
extent, income growth.  Production  meanwhile  is shown not to  increase  as
rapidly. Stocks  tend  to increase  in line  with general  growth  in  the  domestic
market.  The world price is projected  to average  US¢5.8/lb over the whole
period (which  compares  with the 38-year  average  world price up to 1984 of- 27 -
15.1C/lb). The range  of all stochastically  simulated  prices  (1,200  in  total)
is  large,  from  3.1C/lb  to 50.1C/lb. Two-thirds  of the  observations  lie  within
the range  8.8C to 21.8C/lb,  and the  coefficient  of variation  is high  at 0.45
(although  it is less than the 38-year  historical  coefficient  of variation  of
0.71 which partly  reflects  structural  changes  in the  market).  The first  of
the  60 individual  simulations  is shown  in  column  six to give  an indication  of
the  typical  cyclical  variability  in price.
37.  The  projected  annualized  rate  of growth  in  production  is  around  2.5%,
which is slower than that achieved in the previous  three decades.  For
consumption,  the annualized  growth rate is around 3.5%,  which is a little
stronger  than for the previous  decade.  In line with the assumptions  about
exogenous  variables  given by Wong et al. for developing  countries,  annual
population  and income  growth  were set at 2.5%  and 2%,  respectively.  To test
the sensitivity  of the resulto  given  in Table  4, the  model was run a second
time  while  assuming  annual  growth  in disposable  income  averaged  1% only.  The
results are giver.  in Table 5  where it can be seen that the growth in
consumption  has  been  trimmed and  production is  much  the  same; it  is
interesting  to note a slight  reduction  in average  world price  arising  from
Mexico's  reduced  import  demand.
38.  Many un-ertainties  surround  the  ouLlook  for  Mexican  income  and sugar
industry  growth  rates.  Nonetheless,  based  on the simulation  results  it  would
appear  unlikely  that Mexico  will return  to the world  market  as a significant
exporter of  sugar, at  least while  it  retains its  existing policies.
Population  and income growth are likely to cause consumption  to outstrip- 20  -
Table  5:  ProJections  of  Mexican  Sugar  Production,  Consumption,  Trade  and  World  Prices,  1985-2004
01%  Incom Growth  Scenario)
Year-End  World  Price
Year  Production  Consumption  Net  Exports  Stocks  World  Price  SiM.  I  Cane  Price
------------------ …(Million  Tons)-----------------  ------ (1984  US*/lb)------  (1980  pesos/ton
1985  3.45  3.30  0.74  0.76  7.90  6.90  448
1906  3.75  3.40  0.28  0.83  6.60  5.10  483
19i7  3.98  3.58  0.45  0.68  9.50  7.40  435
,',,a  4.29  3.60  0.63  0.94  10.60  12.50  330
Ag9  4.00  3.70  0.36  0.08  14.90  14.30  350
1990  3.94  3.81  0.14  0.87  15.30  18.40  393
1991  3.98  3.93  0.04  0.88  12.60  19.40  393
1992  4.01  4.05  -0.04  0.80  15.60  17.30  393
1993  4.25  4.17  0.03  0.94  26.30  17.70  393
1994  4.63  4.30  0.24  1.02  24.40  26.30  393
iM95  4.70  4.43  0.25  1.03  15.30  25.10  393
1996  4.l7  4.57  0.19  1.05  12.10  9.60  393
1997  4.88  4.71  0.15  1.07  13.00  9.60  393
199  4.98  4.85  0.11  1.10  15.30  15.90  393
1999  5.09  5.00  -0.21  1.12  15.80  20.30  393
2000  5.19  5.16  0.01  1.14  15.10  24.90  393
2001  5.07  5.31  -0.21  1.12  20.20  23.90  393
2002  5.40  5.48  -0.15  1.19  23.00  22.20  393
2003  5.50  5.65  -0.17  1.21  19.30  29.70  393
2004  5.60  5.82  -0.24  1.23  16.80  24.40  393
Mean  of 1200  Observations  15.50
Coefficient  of Variation  0.45
Range  Min-Max  of  60 simulations  3.1-49.5
S of  Observations  in  the  Range  8.8-21.3-67
Source:  IECC), World  8ank.- 29  -
production  and it  is  likely  Mexico  will increasingly  need to rely  on imports
to satisfy  consumption  growth.
The  Effects  of a Change  to Free  Trade
39.  Earlier it was  argued that price fixing and  isolationist  trade
policies  restrict  profitable  opportunities  to adjust  production,  consumption
and trade.  It was also argued  that  regulations  and controls  which  have been
spawned  to support  interventionist  policies  impose  severe  cost  burdens  on the
industry. A scenario  was set  up to test  the  trade  effects  and  to  estimate  the
welfare  impacts  of a change  to free  trade.
40.  To simulate  free trade,  world prices  were transmitted  to consumers
and producers  in place of regulated  prices.  The baseline  assumed  that cane
growers  received  60% of the  millers'  (f.o.b.)  price.  Consumers  were  assumed
to  pay  the  world  raw  price plus  1.7C/lb for  transport, handling and
marketing. The 1.7C/lb  margin  was set in line  with the  assumed  margin  of the
baseline  simulation,  assuming  free trade  would not alter the efficiency  of
marketing.  Some anecdotal evidence suggests free  trade may  result in
reductions  in marketing  margins.  Apparently,  since  November  15, 1989,  when
AZUCAR's  monopoly  acquisition  powers  were abolished,  the  cost  of transporting
sugar  from  Veracruz  to Mexico  City has been  halved.  Failure  to take  account
of such  effects  will tend  to  bias  downward  the  welfare  gains  from  free  trade.
41.  For the  free trade  scenario,  it was  also assumed  that  the  government
sold  all mills from 1989  onwards  and that growers  shortened  their  ratooning- 30 -
length  by two  years--thus  increasing  the  average  yields  of cane.  In terms  of
the earlier  discussion,  such changes  shift the supply  curve rightwards. As
discussed  in the  Appendix  2, and in line with earlier  discussion,  government
ownership  of mills  and ratooning  length  are important  factors  affecting  cane
supply. Changes  in  these  factors  with  a move to free  trade  are  representative
of the  types of supply  shifts  likely  to arise  from  easing  of regulations  and
controls  which  presently  underpin  interventionist  policies.
42.  The  results  of the  free  trade  scenario  are  given  in  Table  6. Compared
to Table  5, production,  trade  and stocks  are more  variable  and  consumption  is
curtailed.  Production  is much higher  with the  result  that import  demand  is
eliminated  and replaced  by significant  exports. By adding  to world  supplies,
the  average  world  price  declines. The effect  of these  changes  on the  welfare
of producers,  consumers,  the  government  and  the  Mexican  economy  in  general  are
given in Table  7.  In the  case  of welfare  changes  in producer  rents,  account
is taken of the increase  in growing  cost likely  to arise from reducing  the
number of  ratoons and  increasing the  proportion of  plant cane  in  the
composition  of harvested  cane.  Costs  of growing  plant  cane  are  greater  than
for  ratoon  cane.  From industry  data  it  was  estimated  that  reducing  the  number
of ratoons  by two would increase  the production  costs  by about USCO.5/lb--
which  must  be offset  against  the  gains  from  the  increase  in  yield.
43.  The welfare measures in Table  7 were calculated in the manner
discussed in  Section III.  For  computational  ease, the welfare effects
(producer  rents) of the supply shifts  were calculated  by solving  for the
equivalent  cane price increase  needed to induce  a supply  response  equal to- 31 -
Table  6:  Projections of Mexican  Sugar  Production, Consumption, Trsde  and
World Prices, 1985-2004 (Free  Trade Scenario)
Year  Production  Consumption  Net Exports  World Price  Cane Price
(1980
------------(Million  Tons)------------  (1984 USC/lb)  Pesos/Ton)
1985  3.42  3.31  0.71  7.62  280
1986  3.61  3.43  0.14  6.45  237
1987  3.66  3.50  0.16  9.72  357
1988  4.05  3.60  0.38  11.22  412
1989  4.61  3.66  0.83  14.48  532
1990  5.47  3.79  1.50  12.39  455
1991  6.11  3.94  2.03  9.37  344
1992  5.83  4.03  1.86  11.90  437
1993  5.83  4.02  1.81  21.94  806
1994  7.23  4.16  2.76  21.24  780
1995  9.03  4.41  4.22  12.52  460
1996  8.73  4.59  4.21  9.28  341
1997  6.92  4.71  2.60  10.29  378
1998  5.72  4.80  1.18  13.31  489
1999  5.79  4.92  0.85  14.46  531
2000  7.12  5.10  1.73  13.50  496
2001  8.01  5.23  2.59  16.88  620
2002  8.60  5.38  3.09  18.38  675
2003  8.90  5.57  3.25  15.55  571
2004  8.80  5.76  3.06  13.75  505
Mean of 1200  Observations  13.60  485.30
Coefficient of Variation  0.44
Range Min-Max of 60 simulations  3.2-42.6
Z of Observations in the Range  8.0-18.6=67
Source:  IECCM, World Bank- 32 -
Table 7:  Welfare  Effects  of a Switch  to Free Trade and Liberalization  of
Domestic  Control.
Producer  Consumer  Government  Economic
Year  Welfare  Welfare  Revenue*  Surplus
-------------------- (1984  US$  Millions)--------------------
1985  -199.70  214  179  193.30
1986  -336.79  310  185  158.21
1987  7.66  75  203  285.66
1988  177.36  -11  176  341.86
1989  619.18  -287  162  494.18
1990  531.70  -192  192  531.70
1991  99.65  62  202  363.65
1992  471.74  -161  190  500.74
1993  2,057.74  -1,083  162  1,136.74
1994  2,222.30  -1,012  233  1,443.30
1995  680.46  -170  235  745.46
1996  -35.23  162  239  365.77
1997  184.72  26  244  454.72
1998  809.95  -403  248  654.95
1999  1,097.18  -595  263  765.18
2000  946.52  -425  275  796.52
2001  1,403.71  -664  186  925.71
2002  1,666.20  -760  362  1,286.20
2003  1,294.90  -556  339  1,077.90
2004  1,112.00  -470  333  975.00
Mean  740.56  -314  230.40  656.96
Benefit  per  $
of transfer  to
consumers  -2.35  1  -0.73  -2.09
*  From  elimination  of profits  and  losses  of exports  and  imports  and from  the
elimination  of subsidies  to  mills.
Source: IECCO,  World  Bank.- 33  -
that  arising  from  the rightward  shift  in the supply  curve.  The welfare
effects  were  then  estimated  in  the  fashion  shown  in  Figure  2.
44.  The government  revenue  saved includes  both direct  subsidies  to
government-operated  mills and indirect  subsidies  through  present  pricing
arrangements.  In recent  years  these  have  been  sizable,  as shown  in Table
A1.2.Under  free  trade  such subsidies  would  be eliminated.  The subsidies
basically  represent  transfer  payments  from the government  to the  milling
sector.  Producer  rents are calculated  net of  these subsidies.  For
calculating  welfare  effects  it  was  assumed  that  the  average  rate  of indirect
subsidy  per  ton  applying  in  the  past  decade  would  continue.  The  difference  in
time  period  reflects  the  availability  of  data.
45.  For  the  economy  as  a  whole,  welfare  is  increased  substantially  in  all
years  with a  move to free  trade.  The main beneficiaries  are producers.
Consumers,  on the  other  hand,  generally  pay  higher  prices  and so are net
losers. Producer  gains  arise  from  higher  average  prices,  from increased
production,  from  timing  production  increases  and  decreases  in line  with  the
world  market  price  cycle,  and from implied  reductions  in costs  given  by
rightward  shifts  in  the  supply  curve. Government  gains,  which  in  effect  are
savings  to taxpayers,  arise from  eliminating  subsidies  on exports.  The
welfare  gains  are  seen  to increase  through  time  because  under  protectionist
policies  the  structure  of  the  domestic  market  diverges  increasingly  from  what
is  optimal  under  free  trade  and  so the  gains  from  a switch  to free  trade
increase.  The  benefits  have  not  been  discounted  to  net  present  value  terms.- 34 -
46.  For individual  consumers  the net cost each year averages  less than
US$3.20  per person,  although  in some  years  the cost may be up to four times
this amount.  However,  due to the very low price elasticity  of demand  for
sugar (see Appendix  2), consumptior.  is only mildly curtailed  even at high
prices. Therefore,  the effect  on the  sugar-using  industries  is not  likely  to
be large.
47.  For individual  producers  the  annual  gains  could  be substantial. But
calculating  the average ,mpact  is complicated. Substantially  more land is
estimated  to come into production  and so it is reasonable  to assume new
farmers  may  come into the industry.  Others may leave and farms may be
amalgamated. Nevertheless,  the average  annual  gains  would amount  to around
US$3,174.  Also, assuming  no change  in the  number  of mills,  annual  average
gains  of around  US$4.2  million  per  mill  are simulated. Mill  workers  and  cane
cutters  may share  some of the simulated  gains  to mills  and  farmers. Although
significantly  higher on  average, incomes would  tend to  be more  highly
variable,  in line with world prices.  Even the variability  in changes in
producer  rents  shown  in  Table  7 do not fully  reflect  the  possible  variability
in incomes.  Individual  simulations  of  the model  show considerably  more
variability. The variability  in world  prices  is probably  the  best indicator
of potential  income  variability. Ninety-five  percent  of simulated  prices  lie
in  the  range  USC5.1/lb  to USC26.2/lb;  67%  lie  in  the  range  8¢ to 18.6C/lb;  the
complete  range  of simulated  prices  is 3.2C/lb  to  42.6c/lb.
48.  However,  in  a free  market  it is  unlikely  that  the  full  variability  in
world  price  would be transmitted  back to producers  due to the  use of futures
markets.  Other special  (long-term  contractual)  arrangements  between  traders- 35  -
and the  industry could flourish  in a  free market.  Vertical  integration
between  mills and sugar users may also lead to more stable  prices  at the
producer  level.  In a free market,  producers'  demands  for  risk spreading  may
spawn  the use of a great  variety  of instruments  and arrangements. The type
and degree  of risk spreading  required  is  likely  to vary  among  producers. The
use  of  a  number of  different instruments  will allow  for optimal risk
spreading.
49.  Often,  government-operated  risk-spreading  schemes  have been favored
over  privately-operated  schemes  in  volatile  commodity  markets. However,  it is
not clear that governments  have a comparative  advantage in providing such
services. When governments  operate  such schemes  they  are  usually  designed  to
apply universally  to all producers.  In fact, such schemes  may be totally
unsuitable for  many  producers.  Moreover, because such  schemes apply
universally,  restrictions  must  be  enforced  which  introduce  new regulations  and
controls.  The parameters  of the instruments  may also become politically
determined. Through  time,  therefore,  rent-seeking  can  alter  the  nature  of the
instrument  as well  as its  effects.
The  Effects  of a Guaranteed  Minimum  Price  Scheme
50.  To examine some of the immediate  impacts  of a government-operated,
risk-reduction  scheme  for producers,  a further  scenario  was simulated. The
guaranteed  price was assumed  to decline  in steps  of USCl/lb  each year from
USC5/lb  in  1990 to zero in 2005.  Hence, the scheme is assumed to be
transitory,  designed  to provide  a cushion  to protect  producers  for  a limited
period  as they adjust to prices  on the world  market.  It was assumed that- 36 -
whenever  the  world  price  fell  below  the  guaranteed  level  the  government  would
make  up  the  difference.
51.  The average  guaranteed  price  over the scheme's  15-year  life is
8C/lb. Over  all  60 simulations  the  percentage  of  prices  falling  below  BE/lb
is  around  16X. Averaged  out  over  all  years  and 11 simulations,  the  annual
expected  payment  by  government  under  this  scheme  would  be  US$95  million.  The
average  annual  expected  increase  in producer  rents  would  be US$93  million,
arising  from  an  average  increase  in  production  of 1.5Z  (or  0.1  million  tons)
and  an expected  3.2Z  increase  in  producer  prices. In  any  particular  year,
payouts  to producers  of over  US$1  billion  may  need  to be made.  For  this
reason,  if  it  is  considered  to  be  politically  desirable  to  protect  producers
for  a limited  period  as they  adjust  to prices  on the  world  market,  direct
income  support  may  have  considerable  advantages  over  price  supports.  Direct
income  support  is  not  open-ended;  it  provides  less  distortionary  price  signals
to  producers;  and  it  can  be  targeted  to  those  groups  most  in  need  of  support.
Discussion  of  Simulation  Results
52.  It  would  appear  from  the  results  presented  that  the  main  effect  of
current  policy  is  to  subsidize  sutgar  consumption.  If  the  objective  of  policy
is to continue  supplying  cheap  sugar,  it appears  that  the  policy  will  be
highly  inefficient.  For  every  US$1  transferred  to  consumers  US$2.09  will  be
lost  from  the  economy  (in  terms  of lost  opportunities).  It will  cost  the
government  an  estimated  US$0.73  and  producers  an  estimated  US$2.35  to  provide
that  support  (see  Table  7).- 37  -
V.  COUCLUUIOU8  ANl  DCOSWIDATOOS
53.  Based  on the evidence  presented  in this paper,  it appears  that the
parformance  of the Mexican sugar  indusLry  falls  well short  of its  economic
potential.  Isolationist  trade policies and  the  plethora of  regulatory
controls  that have evolved  over many years to support  them,  greatly limit
individual  initiative  and opportunity  in the industry;  they fail to provide
efficient  mechanisms  for  allocating  resources,  either  within  the industry  or
between  the  industry  and  the  rest  of the  economy.
54.  The  objectives  of the  sugar  policy  are  not  clear-cut. Policy  appears
to have  evolved  over a long period  in response  to a variety  of political  and
economic  pressures. Accumulated  ad hoc responses  through  time  mean there  is
not an explicit set of consistent  and prioritized  objectives.  The main
effects  of policy appears to be to stabilize  prices to cane growers,  to
deliver health  services  to  cane-growing families, to  disguise rural
underemployment  by creating  jobs  in  sugar  mills,  and  to provide  consumers  with
cheap  sugar.
55.  Achievement  of these  objectives  appears  to occur  at very  high costs.
Despite  some  benefits  accruing  to producers,  the  policy  on balance  appears  to
impose  a high cost on them.  It  also imposes  high  costs  on taxpayers  and the
overall economy.  The only net gainers appear to be consumers,  but the
efficiency  of  the  transfer of  support to consumers from producers and
taxpayers  is very low.  It  would  seem  that less  costly  means  of providing  the
same  benefits  to consumers  could  be  devised.- 38 -
56.  At minimum,  an efficient  Mexicrn  sugar  policy  would  need to embody
the  following:
- more  efficient  mechanisms  for  allocating  resources;
- individual farmers  and  millers  be  given  incentives to
specialize  and  pursue  geographic,  managerial or  other
production,  technological  or  marketing  advantages;
- the world price be recognized  as the value (or opportunity
cost)  of sugar  to the  Mexican  economy--despite  the  distortions
in the world sugar  market,  the factors  that  determine  sugar'  s
place in the  Mexican  economy  and the comparative  advantage  of
individuals and  sectors of  the  industry should  reflect
international  market  realities;
- if  it is deemed politically  desirable to favor particular
groups,  support  should  be provided  as much  as possible  through
direct income support  rather than via prices  which distorts
production  and  consumption  decisions.
Suggestions  for  Policy  Reform
a.  Increase  the  mobility  of land resources;  for  example,  through  competitive
contract  farming  arrangements  that  encourage  good  arm  managers  to expand
their  influence  and  allow  for  larger  parcels  of land  to  be jointly  farm-d.
b.  Privatization  of mills.
c.  Allocation  of regulations  governing  the pricing  of cane in tandem  with
land  and  mill reforms  to  allow  for  negotiation  between  millers  and  growers
over  the  price,  quantity,  quality,  and  delivery  terms  of cane.- 39  -
d.  Dismantle  remaining  barriers  to trade  and allow  world  prices  to be freely
transmitted  to  domestic  cane  and  sugar  markets:
e.  AZUCAR's  remaining  monopoly  acquisition,  exporting  and importing  rights
should  cease,  and in line  with AZUCAR's  other transitional  watchdog  and
agency functions,  it should monitor and anticipate  demand of growers,
mills,  domestic  users  and  traders  for  services  which  facilitate  efficient
marketing  and help establish  stability  in the  market through  the use of
commercial  instruments--this  might,  for example,  include  helping  traders
tailor specific  hedging strategies  and services  for groups  of growers
concerned  about  the  inherent  instability  in  the  world  price.- 40 -
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Appendix  1
THE MATURE  OF THE PRESX  COST  BURDENS
57.  Land:  Legal restrictions  on the sale and renting  of land prevent
efficient  cane farmers  from competing  with less efficLent  cane and non-cane
farmers  for  resources. Although  illegal,  renting  land  occurs  in agriculture.
However,  farmers  are reluctant  to grow cane  on rented  land  because  cane is a
perennial  crop.  Without  a legally  binding  contract  for  the  eight-year  life  of
the crop, the risks associated  with renting land for cane production  are
high.
58.  The restriction  may, in effect, lock land out  of the industry.
Growers  with  a clear  comparative  advantage  are  prevented  from  expanding  either
on existing  cane land or on land currently  used for alternative  purposes.
Moreover,  to increase  production,  efficient  farmers  may use more non-land
inputs than is optimal.  Despite highly diminishing  returns, irrigation
resources,  for instance,  may be fully allocated  to the farmer's existing
parcel  of  land even though the returns to allocating  some of it to new,
presently unirrigated  areas may  be higher.  The effect is to restrict
production  and  raise  the  unit  production  cost.
59.  Total costs of the industry  are also higher  than otherwise  because
high-cost  techniques  of production  are sustained  and  are prevented  from  being
replaced  by lower-cost  techniques  of efficient  farmers. Over  the  longer  term,
such  effects  may be magnified  because  farm  amalgamation  is  restricted. As a
result,  the  rate  of  capitalization,  mechanization  and  achievement  of  economies- 42 -
of scale  on farms  are restricted. And the  rate  at which  progressive  farmers
can  introduce  higher  yielding  varieties  of cane  and  new  technology  is limited.
Unable to pursue their comparative  advantages,  progressive  entrepreneurial
farmers who  might  otherwise provide important business and  commercial
leadership,  could  be lost  from  the  industry.
60.  Cane pricing:  Regulations  governing  the pricing  and delivery  terms
for  cane distort the  incentives  facing growers and  millers and  impede
maximization  of efficiency  in the  industry. The basis  for  payment  to growers
involves  a guaranteed  minimum  of 83 kg of estandar  sugar  for  each ton  of cane
delivered,  irrespective  of the actual sugar content  of the cane.  Growers
collectively  receive  bonuses  if the seasonal  mill average  exceeds  83 kg of
sugar  per  ton of cane.  They receive  no penalty  if the result  falls  short  of
this level  and, under  certain  circumstances,  can still  receive  a bonus. For
the  basis  of payment  the  mills'  maximum  permitted  loss  of sugar  in  milling  is
limited  to 26.4 kg measured  estandar  sugar per ton of cane.  The growers'
sugar  content  is,  therefore,  deemed  to  be the  actual  yield  of sugar  per  ton  of
cane  minus  the  minimum  of the  actual  milling  loss  or 26.4  kg.
61.  Because payment for cane is not based on the sugar content from
individual  farms,  there  is a  classic  "free-rider"  problem. Growers  who supply
high-quality  cane cross-subsidize  those supplying  low-quality  cane in the
event  that  a bonus  is payable. If, because  of low-quality  cane,  less  than  83
kg of sugar per ton of cane is produced,  mills are forced to subsidize
suppliers--although  a  mill's risk of receiving  very low quality cane is
limited  under collectively  negotiated  contracts  specifying  that mills are- 43 -
obliged  only to accept  cane of a certain  guaranteed  minimum  standard.  The
contracts  also provide  the mills  with a wide range  of controls  which  enable
them  to greatly  influence  agronomic  practices  and  thereby  ensure  that  certain
minimum  standards  are met.  Nonetheless,  farmers  (and mill managers)  do not
have  any incentive  to optimize  the sugar  content  of their  cane. As a result,
output  and  productivity  are  prouably  sub-optimal.
62.  Because  growers  are  not paid  on the  sugar  content  of their  cane  they
have little  incentive  to deliver  their  cane  quickly  to the  mill  after  cutting.
Once cut, bacteria  act to reduce  the  sugar  content  of cane.  Losses  of sugar
content increase exponentially  as  the  time between cutting and crushing
increases. In  Mexico,  the  average  time  to  deliver  cane  after  cutting  is  about
90 hours.  By comparison,  in Colombia  it is around  24  hours  and in  Australia,
a  country  that achieves  exceptionally  high levels  of sugar  content,  the time
is less than eight  hours.  The sugar  content  of cane greatly  influences  the
efficiency  of milling. The higher  the sugar  content  the  lower  the  unit cost
of milling.  Failure to optimize  the sugar content  therefore  impairs  mill
efficiency.
63.  Just as mills  cannot  change  cane prices  to reward  supplies  of high-
quality  cane,  they cannot  change  prices  to influence  cane suppliers  in other
ways.  Without being able to encourage  or discourage  the quantity  of cane
delivered,  achieving  the  optimal  use of milling  capacity  is a major  problem.
For instance,  premiums  and discounts  on the price of cane throughout  the
season  would allow  the mill to adjust  the season  length  to its  optimum,  but
are  not  used.- 44 -
64.  The sugar  content  of cane changes  throughout  the season,  reaching  a
peak  in mid-season. To achieve  a high sugar  content,  growers  seek  as  short  a
season  length  as  possible. However,  for  the  industry  as a whole  (and  for  mill
areas that could expand cane production  or close mills) it should pay to
extend  the  season  length  in both  directions  up to the  point  where  the  marginal
cost of cane and milling  equals  the marginal  revenue  from sugar  production.
For mill areas that cannot expand cane production,  more sugar could be
extracted  by shortening  the season  length  and using  surplus  intraseason  mill
capacity.
65.  Mills are not penalized  for sugar  losses  up to 24.6 kg per ton of
cane,  and therefore  have no incentive  to control  such losses. Indeed,  they
may  have  incentive  to produce  more  or higher  quality  by-products  (molasses  and
alcohol)  and less sugar  than might be optimal  for the industry  as a whole.
Mills do  not share revenues from by-products  or black market sales with
growers  and therefore  it  may pay them  to allow  the permitted  26.4  kg loss  of
sugar  to  be transferred  to  molasses  or  alcohol  production  or to be sold  on the
black market.  Table A1.l shows that mills, on average,  have consistently
achieved  close  to the  permitted  loss.
66.  The incentive  for  mills  to  optimize  sugar  output  is  also  distorted  in
other  ways.  The sugar  prices  paid  to growers  and  mills  are  set  independently
by two  separate  government  bodies  and  can  move  out  of alignment. Although  the
marginal  cost  to  growers  of increased  sugar  extraction  is  zero,  mills  must pay
bonuses  for cane (based  on the prevailing  price of cane) as they increase
their  extraction  rate.  Because  of these  differential  pricing  arrangements  it- 45  -
Table  All:  Loss  of Sugar  in  Milling
Measured  Sucrose  Sugar  Yield  Sugar  Lose
Year  Content  of Cane  Per  Ton  Cane  Per  Ton  Cane
X  X  X  Kg
1981  11.28  8.25  3.03  30.3
1982  11.34  8.42  2.92  29.2
1983  11.78  8.89  2.89  28.9
1984  11.53  8.74  2.79  27.9
1985  11.58  9.03  2.55  25.5
1986  11.80  9.14  2.66  26.6
Source: AZUCAR.
would  seem  that  the  marginal  cost  to  mills  of extracting  sugar  from  cane  could
move in rather  arbitrary  ways relative  to the  marginal  revenue  from  increased
sugar production.  It  is highly unlikely, therefore, that mills  face
incentives  to optimize  extraction  of sugar.
67.  Moreover,  because  the price  of cane is not related  to the price  of
sugar,  mills  can be caught  in a cost-price  squeeze. Such  a  situation  forced
many mills to  sell out  to  the government  during the seventies.  Other
consequences  of the cost-price  squeeze  have been to force  some  mills  to make
black  market  sales  of sugar  to ensure  their  survival;  and in  the  case  of many
public  mills,  it has led to a need  for  continual  direct  underwriting  of mill
losses  by the  government  (see  Table  A1.2).
68.  Civen the manner in which the cane-  and sugar-pricing  arrangements
can  distort milling  margins,  it  is  unlikely that  mills  face  incentives  to- 46 -
Table  A1.2:  Direct  and Indirect  Subsidies  to Mille
(Constant  1989  Dollars)
Year  Direct  a/  Indirect  b/
1977  na  161
1978  na  191
1979  na  179
1980  na  0
1981  na  0
1982  168  82
1983  81  12
1984  91  0
1985  131  38
1986  116  30
1987  94  0
1988  32  na
1989  92  na
a/  Source: AZUCAR.
b/  Difference  between  the  mill  door  and  the
consumer  price  times  production.
optimize  investment  and capacity  utilization. Over the 1987/88  season,  an
average  of 41 days (about  26%) of intraseasonal  mill capacity  was idle.  The
season  length  of mills  ranged  from  as little  as 63  days to  as high  as 224  days
and lost  time  ranged  from  as little  as 8X to as  high as 53%. The  variability
in  lost  time  and season  length  provide  an indication  of the  scope  for  altering
both  factors  to  enhance  efficiency.
69.  Excluding  the  cost  of purchasing  cane,  about  80%  of the  annual  costs
of milling  are fixed.  The marginal  cost  of milling  is therefore  only about
201 of the average  cost of milling.  Better  utilization  of existing  milling
capacity,  achieved  either through  increased  cane production  or through  mill
closures  and  other  rationalizations,  could  significantly  lower  average  milling- 47 -
costs. However,  without  the  ability  to easily  adjust  cane  supplies  and  facing
greatly  distorted  milling margins,  millers  are restricted  in achieving  such
economies  of  scale.  Economies  of  scale also relate to the absolute or
technical  capacity  of the  mill.  Average  mill size  in Mexico  is  approximately
one-half  that of Brazil and is one indicator  of the potential  to improve
milling  efficiency.
70.  Another  indicator  of the  potential  to increase  efficiency  in  milling
relates to the scope to introduce  new technologies.  By comparison  with
Brazil, South  Africa  and  Australia, Mexican  milling  technology lags
considerably.  The number  of rollers  used at each stage  of crushing  is fewer
and the idea of force feeding  cane has not been introduced  to any great
extent.  For this reason  the rate of sugar  extraction  is not as high as in
other  countries. This is consistent  with the  incentive  structure  which  fails
to reward  millers  for  minimizing  sugar  losses.
71.  Within  the cane payment  arrangements  is the obligation  of mills to
provide  mill suppliers  and their  families  a minimum  level  of health  services.
Irrespective  of the  quantity  of cane supplied,  suppliers  qualify  for  the  same
health  coverage.  The value of this service  exceeds  that granted  to other
rural  workers. Thus,  land  owners  have  a strong  incentive  to supply  at least  a
small  amount  of cane irrespective  of their  comparative  advantage  in producing
cane.  This  is an additional  factor  causing  mill  margins  to move in  arbitrary
ways  and  encourages  the  continuation  of small-scale  farming  practices. In the
1987/88  season,  43Z of farmers  harvested  areas  smaller  than  2  hectares  and  69%
harvested  areas  less  than  4 hectares.- 48  -
72.  Because  the  pricing  mechanism  is  not  used  to  coordinate  activities
between  the  growing  and  milling  sectors,  alternative  instruments  and  arrange-
ments have been devised.  Committees  made up  of  grower and miller
representatives  have  been  formed  to  devise  programs  for  growing,  cultivation,
mechanization,  harvesting  and  delivery.  Allocation  of  resources  within  mill
areas therefore  tend to be centralized  to a large  extent,  which limits
initiatives  of  individual  farmers.
73.  Milling  assets: Without  a competitive  market  for  milling  capital
there  can  be  no assurance  that  mill  management  is  efficient,  that  location,
size  and  capacity  utilization  of  mills  is  optimal,  or  that  financing  and  the
rate  of  adoption  of  new  technology  is  appropriate.  Government  ownership  and
centralized  and  bureaucratic  decision-making  processes  stemming  from  it,  lock
entrepreneurship  out  of the  public  milling  sector  and  reztrict  the  adoption  of
modern  management  ideas  and  systems.
74.  Centralized  controls  take away the flexibility  needed  by individual
mill managers to solve problems quickly.  Moreover, government  influence
places  political  constraints  on  the  profit  function  of  mills. One  outcome  of
such influence  has been chronic overmanning  in mills and  generous wage
settlements.  Anecdotal evidence of  the  seriousness  of  this problem is
demonstrated  through  the comparison  of the labor productivity  of a Mexican
mill  with  a neighboring  mill  in Belize.
75.  The Alvaro Obregon mill on Mexico's southern  border with Belize
produces  22 tons  of sugar  per day  per  worker. By comparison,  the Tower  Hill
sugar  mill in  Belize  just  over the  Mexican  border  achieves  36 tons  per  worker- 49 -
per  day  (some  601  higher).  The  Mexican  mill  could  have  an  advantage  through
economies  of  scale.  It  produces  10,000  tons  of  sugar  daily,  compared  to  6,000
tons  for  the  Tower  Hill  mill. Given  that  labor  costs  absorb  around  401  of  the
milling  margin,  labor  productivity  is  very  important.  A  60X  increase  in  labor
productivity  in  the  Mexican  mill  would  equate  to  161  lower  milling  costs. In
Colombia,  mill  labor  productivity  is  double  that  in  Mexico  and  so  gains  in
excess  of  601  may  be  realistic  in  the  long  term.
76.  Until  recently,  the  government  of Mexico  owned  around  701  of the
sugar  mills.  Although  the operation  of private  mills is constrained  by
similar  regulatory  restrictions  to  the  public  mills,  the  cost  of  production  in
private  mills  is less  than  for  public  mills. In 1983,  public  sector  costs
were  171  higher  on  average.  In  a  move  to  reduce  the  high  costs  arising  from
government  ownership,  the  government  has  been  selling  mils. To  date,  19  mills
(nearly  401  of  the  government  mills)  have  been  sold.
77.  Although  the  privatization  of  mills  may  allow  for  some  increase  in
efficiency,  remaining  regulatory  controls  will continue  to restrict  the
efficiency  of  mills. Mills  remain  vulnerable  to  a cost-price  squeeze  due  to
the discordant  fashion  in which  cane  prices,  mill door sugar  prices  and
consumer  prices  are  set. Until  prices  are  determined  in  ways  that  reflect  the
complex  trade-offs  that  exist  between  the  cane-growing  and  milling  sectors,
opportunities  for private  mills to enhance  industry  efficiency  will be
limited.
78.  Further,  the generous  wage settlements  and other  work conditions
granted  mill workers  may not be changed  quickly. Mill  workers  are well- 50  -
organized  and have a national  labor contract  which to some extent  protects
their  terms  and  conditions.  However,  privatization  has  broken  the  nexus  which
helped unite mill workers during the seventies  and most of the eighties.
Collective  bargaining  with a diverse  range  of mill owners  may  not be achieved
as easily  as in the past when the government  owned 70X of the mills.  As a
result,  future  wage settlements  may tend to be more conservative  than in the
past.  Nonetheless,  the union power of the mill workers  may allow them to
resist  moves  to improve  labor  productivity.
79.  Consumer  price  discrimination:  Until  recently,  different  prices  were
charged by AZUCAR to different  consumers  of sugar.  For instance,  higher
prices were  charged to  foreign-owned  soft drink manufacturers than  to
domestically-owned  companies. While such  arrangements  have the potential  to
create  distortions  in the pattern  of consumption,  demand  is typically  highly
price  inelastic. So the distortions  are likely  to be minor.  Perhaps,  more
importantly,  differential  pricing  creates  an incentive  for  black  marketeering.
The administrative  and enforcement  costs of effectively  policing  such price
differentials  would be high.  Without  strict  enforcement,  and to the extent
that  black  marketeering  occurs,  resources  would be wasted  in the unnecessary
double  handling  of sugar.
80.  Pan-Mexican  pricing: The  fixing  of sugar  prices  at the  same  level  at
all locations  throughout  Mexico  means thX..  transport,  handling  and storage
costs  are unlikely  to be minimized. For instance,  pan-Mexican  pricing  does
not provide  incentives  for  mills located  close  to export  ports  to specialize
in the production  of export  grade sugar  (usually  raw) or for  others  close  to
major  population  centers  to specialize  in the  production  of  different  (usually- 51 -
more refined)  grades of  sugar.  Further,  the specification  of prices and
quotas  for three  grades  of sugar  restricts  the range  of sugar  available  and
limits  opportunities  for  vertical  integration  and  specialization  by  mills.
81.  Monopoly  scquisition  and marketing:  The absence  of competition  in
marketing  means  that  the  marketing  agent,  AZUCAR,  is under  little  pressure  to
contain  costs.  Moreover,  subsidization  of AZUCAR's  financial  losses  by the
government  virtually  absolves  the marketing  agent  of responsibility  for the
costs of its activities.  In 1989, the subsidy  amounted to around US$350
million.  Such  protection inhibits the  development  of  alternative and
innovative  marketing  approaches.
82.  The need for a  monopoly  marketing  agent has been argued on the
grounds that it  facilitates  the making and upholding of government-to-
government  contracts,  to coordinate  storage  and shipping,  to prevent  black
marketeering arising  from  differential pricing,  and  to  economize on
commercial,  technical  and information-gathering  efforts. However,  the  need to
have  a monopoly  agent  to achieve  such  objectives  is not  obvious.  Mexico  holds
only  one small  export  contract  with another  government--the  United  States  for
10,000  tons.  Quotas  could be auctioned  off to supply  this premium  market.
Further,  monopoly  marketing  arrangements  by themselves  wil' not prevent  black
marketeering  and  there is no apparent reason  why a  public single seller
(restricted  in any case to marketing  the Mexican  crop only) should  have an
advantage over  private traders in  achieving conmnercial,  technical and
information  economies  or in  coordinating  marketing  flows.- 52  -
Appendix  2
MODEL  SPECIFICATION,  UTIKATIOU AND  LINITATIOUS
83.  The model is an  annual  dynamic  model  of  production,  consumption,
stock  demand,  and trade.  The model .s designed  to be linked  to the nine-
sector  model  of Wong,  Sturgiss  and Borrell  (1989).  The-rest-of-world  sector
of  Wong,  Sturgiss and  Borrell (1989) has  been re-estimated  with Mexico
excluded  from  the sector.
The  Model
o  production:
- - MI *M2*CP  +M3*CP  *M4*CP  *15*CP  +M6*CP  *M7*CP  +M8*CP
*M9*T  *M1O*D  *e  (1)
A a  Mll  *M12*CP  *M13*GM  +  M14*OL  *M15*T  *e  (2)
R = K1  (3)
Q a  Y*A*R  (4)
o  consumption:
C *  M16  *Ml7*Y  +M18*SP  +  e  (5)
o  stock  demand:
S  a  M19*Q  (6)
o  cane  pricing:
CP a  K2  or  WP  (7)
o  sugar  price  (consumers):
SP a  K3  or  WP+K4  (8)
o  market  clearing:
S +Q  U  C  +S-53 -
where  Q is sugar  production;  Y  is yield  of cane per  hectare;  A is area
harvested  in thousands  of hectares;  R is the sugar  extracted  from cane as a
proportion  of cane;  C is per  person  sugar  consumption;  S is  end-of-year  sugar
stocks;  CP is the real  cane  price  (1980  pesos/ton);  D is  a dummy  representing
the  effects  of  weather  on production;  Y is  per  person  disposable  income;  SP is
the price of sugar (1970 pesos/kg);  WP is the world price  of sugar (1984
C/lb);  GM is the  number  of mills  owned  by the  government;  T is a square  root
trend;  OL is the  international  price  of oil (1984  $/barrel);  e is  the  residual
and  t  denotes  the  year;  M denotes  parameters;  and  K denotes  constants.
Production
84.  Because  the government  virtually  guarantees  the supply  of milling
services  to growers,  all cane  grown  is  milled. Production  therefore  responds
to the price that growers receive rather than that received  by millers.
Although  several  alternative  crops  could  be grown in the  place  of cane,  cane
is a ratooning  monocultural  crop in Mexico  being grown for about seven  or
eight years before replanting.  In addition,  under collectively  negotiated
contracts  between  growers  and their  mill,  the  freedom  of individual  growers  to
change  to  alternative  crops  is  restricted--at  least  in  the  short  run. And,  as
stated  earlier,  health  benefits  attaching  to the growing  of cane may reduce
growers'  incentives to  switch  crops.  No  statistically significant
relationship  could  be found  between  sugar  production  and  the  current  or lagged
maite,  bean  or tomato  prices.
85.  The  yields  of cane  over the  life  of the  cane plant  follow  a distinct
pattern.  The first crop (the "plant"  crop) generally  provides  the highest- 54  -
yield.  In subsequent  years, yields  decline;  although the rate of decline
lessens  progressively. It therefore  might be expected  that in response  to a
rise in the cane price,  new plantings  and increased  replanting  of old cane
might  initially  raise  yields  above  average. However,  as the  cane  ages,  yields
eventually  decline  and fall below  average.  To capture  this behavior  in the
production  equation,  an Almon  polynomial  lag  of degree  3  was fitted. In line
with the  current  long ratooning  pattern,  six lags and the  current  price  were
specified  in the equation.  Responses  to the current  price  and, to a large
extent,  to the one-year  lagged price occur not through new plantings  but
through  increased  application  of variable  inputs.
86.  Adverse  weather  is  a major  cause  of yield  declines. Adrerse  weather
conditions  can affect several countries  in any year, since conditions  in
different  regions  are  often interrelated. (For example,  the well-documented
El Nino effect links droughts in Asia and  Australia  with floods in the
Caribbean  and  South  America.) For this  reason,  the  weather  dummy used in  the
Cuban  and  rest-of-the-world  sectors  of the  model  of Wong  et al.  was also  used
as a proxy  for weather  conditions  in Mexico.  Note that, in this case,  the
dummy  does  not simply  remove  outliers  in estimation  (although  it  may do so),
since  the  choice  of years  is  not  determined  from  the  Mexican  production  data.
87.  Improvements  in technology  typically  lead  to increases  in crop  yields
through  time. A square  root  trend  was fitted  to take  account  of the  expected
declining  rate  of technological  and  yield  improvements.
88.  Increases  in  area  cannot  be  made instantaneously.  If price  rises  are
announced  prior to planting,  a lag of approximately  two years occurs  before- 55  -
increased  plantings  are  harvested.  Planning  and  land  preparation  may  involve
lags of several  months.  Once planted,  the plant crop is left to grow
approximately  18 months before harvesting  (subsequent  ratoon crops are
harvested  every 12  months).  For reasons explained  earLier,  producers
currently  have  little  incentive  to anticipate  real  changes  in domestic  cane
price.
89.  As  argued  in  Section  III,  government  ownership  of  mills  is likely  to
have  imposed  severe  cost  burdens  on  the  industry,  causing  a  negative  influence
on  production.
90.  The oil price  boom of the seventies  and early  eighties  impacted
negatively  on  sugar  areas. It  strongly  fueled  inflation  which,  given  the  lags
and  arbitrariness  of  adjustment to  fixed prices, caused considerable
uncertainty  about  the  movements  in real  prices  and  mill  margins. Secondly,
flush  with  oil  revenues  the  urgency  for  the  government  to  maintain  rural-based
exports  such  as  sugar  was  lessened  and  the  rate  of investment  and  maintenance
of government-owned  mills  lessened. The  political  power  of the  rural  groups
may  also  have  lessened  causing  investment  in  new irrigation  schemes  and  other
rural  infrastructure  to  decline.
91.  Through time, development  of  infrastructure  and  technological
improvements  allow  for  the  opening  of new  land  for  cropping. Because  there
must  be some  limit  to the  amount  of land  that  can  be  ultimately  developed,  a
square  root  trend  was used  to account  for  this  influence.  A study  conducted
in  the  seventies  concluded  there  were  considerable  areas  of  lands  suitable  for
cane  production  in  Mexico. An  area  approximately  three  times  the  current  *a,a
was  identified  as  suitable.- 56  -
92.  No meaningful  behavioral  relationjhip  describing  movements in the
amount  of sugar  extracted  from  cane could  be econometrically  estimated. The
sugar  content  of cane extracted  was, therefore,  set at the  average  prevailing
over  the  estimation  period,  1967  to 1987.
93.  The estimated  parameters  of the model are  given in Table Al.  The
elasticity  of supply  response  to the current price is estimated  a' around
0.06.  The combined  elasticity  for the current  and following  year is 0.16.
Combining  the current  and two following  years  gives an elasticity  of around
0.35.  The  long-run price elasticity (after allowing for all  lags) is
estimated  at 0.63.
Consumption
94.  Per person consumption  of sugar is modeled as a function  of the
regulated current price  of  sugar  and  per  person  disposable  income.
Alternative  sweeteners  are not major substitutes  for sugar in Mexico.  The
price  elasticity  of demand  was  estimated  at -0.004. The income  elasticity  was
estimated  at 0.5.
Stock  Demand
95.  Several  different  specifications  of stock  demand  were estimated. In
simulation,  however, they did not perform well so  stocks  were set as a
proportion  of production.  The proportion  was  set equal to the average- 57 -
proportion  over  the  estimation  period. Pipeline  stocks  and those  held  for
transactions  purposes  will  generally  grow  in line  with  the  volume  of sugar
handled. Production  is a suitable  indicator  of such  requirements  and is
included  as an  explanatory  variable  for  this  reason. It  is  also  included  to
help  represent  a short-run  stock  adjustment  process  whereby  stocks  are  used  to
smooth  trade  flows  in  the  face  of  production  variability.
Cane  Prices
96.  No significant  behaviorial  relationships  describing  movements  in  the
cane  or consumer  sugar  prices  could  be econometrically  estimated. Prices
were,  therefore,  set  at the  average  prevailing  over  the  estimation  period,
1967  to  1987.
Data
97.  Production  data  was  taken  from  AZUCAR  (1988). Consumption  data  and
stock  data  were  taken  from  the  International  Sugar  Organization's  Yearbook
(1987  and earlier  editions).  Cane prices,  inflation  indices  and real
effective  exchange  rates  were  obtained  from  the  Reserve  Bank  of  Mexico.  Sugar
prices  and  per  capita  incomes  were  taken  from  Chavez  (1989).- 58 -
Table A2.1:  Parameter Estimates of the Mexican Sugar Model
Equation  Coefficient  Estimate  t  Statistics  R  DW
1  Ml  19.0412  0.795798
M2  0.0103  1.02866
M3  0.028564  3.46394
M4  0.029361  2.85887
M5  0.019224  1.78429
M6  0.004687  0.417435
M7  -0.00771  -0.06792
M8  -0.01145  -1.32601
M9  3.97951  3.55797
M1o  -3.19686  -2.58354  0.692  2.3
SUMLAC  0.07296
2  Mul  -370.729  -3.50727
M12  0.17568  1.64108
M13  -3.09742  -2.49055
M14  -1.53628  -1.66036
M15  166.335  6.98492  0.916  1.6
5  M16  21.784  7.97602
M17  0.002095  8.20093
M18  -1.19066  -2.58433  0.833  1.89
6  M19  0.22
3  K1  8.8
7  K2  393
8  K3  1.43
9  K4  1.7
Note:  K2 and K3 from 1989 onwards.
Model Limitations
98.  There are limitations relating to the model, data, and assumptions of
the analysis.  Chief among these is the assumption that shifts in the supply- 59  -
curve  will be parallel. Parallel  shifts  assume  equal  reductions  in  marginal
costs of all units of production. The method  of modeling  used can give no
assurance  that  this is indeed  the  case.  However,  in the  case  of the  measured
average  increase  in yields  arising  from reducing  the number  of ratoon  crops
before replanting,  parallel shifts seem reasonable.  In the case of the
effects  of reduced  government  ownership  of  mills,  it is  less  clear  that supply
shifts  would  be parallel. Non-parallel  shifts  would  provide  lesser  gains  than
those estimated  here.  Nevertheless,  only two of several  potential supply
curve shifts  are considered  in the analysis.  Other shifts in the supply
curve,  made possible  by a liberalizing  of trade and production,  may provide
large  additional  gains.  For instance,  no attempt  has been  made to quantify
the  additional  costs  imposed  on the  industry  due to pricing  arrangements  which
take away producers'  incentives  to anticipate  the world market and adjust
production  accordingly.
99.  It is  not unreasonable  to assume  that  the current  lagged  response  to
changes  in domestically-set  prices  would lessen  if producers  faced  the  world
price.  That no strong  econometric  evidence  could be found to establish  a
behavioral  relationship  describing  government  (real)  price setting,  suggests
movements  in domestic  prices  are largely  unpredictable. Furthermore,  prices
are  relatively stable.  Therefore, producers have  little  incentive to
anticipate  prices  at present.  By contrast,  the econometric  results  of the
world  model  used  in  this  study  suggest there  are  some  elements of
predictability  about the world market price, and it is a highly variable
market.- 60  -
100.  In  a free  market,  producers  would  have large  incentives  to anticipate
the world  market  and exploit  the cyclical  nature  of the prices  by adjusting
their  ratooning  pattern  accordingly. Production  increases  better  synchronized
with price rises could be expected  over and above the present simulation
results.  Other shifts in the  supply curve may  also occur.  Width  less
intervention,  better cane-pricing  arrangements  which provide incentives  to
grow and deliver  cane of higher  quality  may emerge.  Increases  in the sugar
content and  extraction  of  sugar,  industry-wide, may  provide  further
substantial  gains.
101.  In sum, while there may be limitations  relating to the modeling
approach  used here, the results at very least suggest that the scale of
problems  in  the  sugar  industry  is,  in all  probability,  very large.PRE  WoN  PEapr  cArIIs
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